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PRIVATE

PART I*
ROBERT

I.

J.

AFFELDT'I

INTRODUCTION

THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964' prohibits certain private and
public groups from discriminating because of race, color, sex,
religion, or national origin. Title I prohibits discrimination in the
matter of voting rights; Title II outlaws discrimination by business
establishments offering goods or services to the public; Title III prohibits discrimination in the use of publicly owned or operated facilities;
Title IV prohibits discrimination in public education; Title V establishes the Commission on Civil Rights; Title VI prohibits discrimination in projects receiving federal aid, and Title VII outlaws discrimination in employment.
By far, Title VII is the most controversial and most important
provision in the Act. It was initially the most controversial because
the private sectors of the economy - the labor unions, the corporations and the employment agencies - resented governmental intrusion
into what they had always considered the area of private decisionmaking - the employment relationship. As such, Title VII, in its
final form, bears the marks of this controversy. With its exemptions
and exceptions it is the most complicated title in the Act.
It is the most important title in the Act because by protecting
job status it protects a basic value which is the key to all other
political and civil rights. The right to enter a university or the right
to eat in a public restaurant are empty rights to a person who does
not have tuition or a dime to buy a cup of coffee.' In belatedly incorporating Title VII into the Civil Rights Act, Congress recognized
the fundamental axiom of an industrial society - that an individual
to be integrated into the political and social community must first
* This is the first of a two-part article. The second part will appear in a
subsequent issue of the Villanova Law Review.
t Director of Conciliation, Equal Housing, HUD. Consultant to and Conciliator for Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, 1968. A.B., University of
Detroit, 1943; M.A., University of Detroit, 1946; LL.B., Notre Dame University,
1951; LL.M., Yale University, 1957.
1.42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1964).
2. "Certainly itwould have been naive to ignore the social truism that people
who are hungry can hardly be expected to appreciate the values of either education or
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be integrated into the economic community.' Today, economic citizenship is the passport to political and social citizenship and this the Act,
at least in theory, recognizes.
The Civil Rights Act is an historic piece of twentieth century
legislation not so much for what it says, but for what it reflects. It
reflects, beneath its surface, a desperate national concern, not only
with the oppression of the races but with the oppression of all freedom. The Act mirrors more than a "black" revolution; it mirrors a
"social" revolution, whose object is to refashion American institutions
so that both personal freedom and institutional freedom can co-exist.4
It is the first major piece of legislation which imposes institutional
checks upon organized centers of power, on behalf of the unorganized
individual. Its theme of institutional responsibility marks the beginning of a new social trend, that of enhancing personal freedom and
human dignity - the chief function of a free society.
Title VII, in protecting employment rights, recognizes that we
have moved from a mercantile society based upon real property and
contract to an industrial feudal society based upon intangible property
and status. "For the vast majority of men their most valuable property is not their TV set, their home, or their car, but their job, their
profession, their franchise, their contracts. The right to use their
labor and skill has become their most valuable property right."5 The
pre-industrial institutions of the farm, the village, and the retail store
no longer serve as shields against arbitrary institutional invasions of
personality.
The fundamental unit in the new industrial feudal society is not
the person, but the group. "Group decisions affect our lives from
the cradle to the grave far more intimately and far more powerfully
the franchise." Ming, Critique on "The Constitution and Job Discrimination," 39
WASH. L. Rtv. 104-05 (1964).
3. Title VII was not a part of the original Civil Rights Bill submitted to Congress by President Kennedy on June 19, 1963. It was later added by Congress.
4. The Negro problem in America is but one local and temporary facet of that
eternal problem of world dimension - how to regulate the conflicting interests of
groups in the best interest of justice and fairness. The latter ideals are vague
and conflicting, and their meaning is changing in the course of the struggle.
G.

MYRDAL, AN AMERICAN DILEMMA

69 (1964).

5. Affeldt, Group Sanctions and Sections 8(b)(7) and 8(b)(4): An Integrated
Approach to Labor Law, 54 GEo. L.J. 55, 70 (1965). See F. TANNZNBAUM, A
PHLOSOPHY or LABOR 9 (1951), which states:
We have become a nation of employees. We are dependent upon others for
our means of livelihood, and most of our people have become dependent upon
wages. If they lose their jobs they lose every resource, except for the relief
supplied by the various forms of social security. Such dependence of the mass of
the people upon others for ALL Of their income is something new in the world.
FOR OUR GENERATION, THE SUBSTANCE or LnP
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than the decisions of government." 6 These groups, for the most part,
possess a stranglehold over employment opportunities. The employee
who loses his union card, the doctor who loses his membership in
the AMA, the lawyer who loses his license, are outcasts not only from
the group but also from society. We have permitted large industrial
unions to exercise almost plenary power over the lives of their members; craft unions are permitted to determine who shall work and
who shall not work; large corporations are permitted to carve out
economic outposts from which they exact tribute from consumers and
complete obedience from employees. The rule of law in the form of
economic due process has had little success in penetrating these fortresses.
If personal freedom, therefore, is to be maintained within our
society, the legal process must provide the same safeguards to the
new property as it afforded the old property. This group citizenship
means much more than the right of the individual to a paycheck; it
directly affects his past, present, and future life. It should mean: (1)
the right to become a member of the economic group; (2) the privileges
of economic citizenship - such rights as seniority, pension funds, insurance, vote, etc.; (3) .the right to economic due process - all the
benefits of the grievance procedure; (4) the right to dissent within
the group; (5) the right of fair representation by the union; and (6)
the right of fair treatment ,bythe employer.
It is necessary, therefore, in order for a person to achieve autonomy in the matters of the spirit, freedom of speech, freedom of
religion, freedom of association, etc., that he have a citadel which is
secure from all group invasions. Another name for this citadel is
the new property -

first class group citizenship -

which should be

constitutionally protected under the due process clause of the fifth and
fourteenth amendments. To strike at this new property is to strike at
the rights of personality, for they are intimately tied together. "We
are becoming a society 'based upon relationships and status - status
deriving primarily from source of livelihood. Status is so closely
linked to personality that destruction of one may well destroy the
other. Status must therefore be surrounded with the kind of safe7
guards once reserved for personality."
Despite the fact that group citizenship involving the right to work
is a basic, fundamental right deserving of constitutional protection,
the legal process has afforded little protection to it. The common law
refused to recognize any right to work. Under the common law an
6. Affeldt, supra note 5, at 68.
7. Reich, The New Property,73 YALZ L.J. 733, 785 (1964).
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employer had the absolute right to discharge the employee for any
reason; the employment relationship being an "at will" relationship.8
Federal legislation, such as the National Labor Relations Act, has
done very little to protect job status, for, as interpreted by the courts,
the employer can dismiss his employees at will, for good cause, for
no cause, or even for bad cause.9 The only type of discharge prohibited by the NLRA is a discharge actuated by anti-union reasons,
and since it is very difficult for the Board's general counsel, who has
the burden of proof, to demonstrate that the employer's real intent
is to discharge because of union action, little protection is given to
the employees.
The United States Constitution does not follow employment rights
into the private sector of the economy. Since 1883, the date of the
Civil Rights Cases, the Supreme Court has held that the constitutional
amendments only applied to state action, not to private action.' ° Lately,
however, the Court has liberally extended the concept of "state action"
to the private sector when the government has become involved,"
ratified,' 2 supported" or enforced 4 the actions of private organizations. Although this trend is encouraging, imposing public responsibilities upon private governments exercising quasi-public functions,
the doctrine does not stretch far enough to touch the source of the
employment problem invasion by large corporations and labor
unions.
Another possible aspect of the legal process which could be used
to protect job rights is the "executive action" concept. Governmental
protection of job rights in government contracts has been recognized
since President Roosevelt's executive order of 1941." Unfortunately,
however, the legal process is in default here to. The Office of Federal
Contract Compliance, which oversees the enforcement of federal contracts, relies almost exclusively upon persuasion, not judicial enforcement. Indeed, it is not at all clear whether these contracts can be
8. Blades, Employment at Will v. Individual Freedom: On Limiting the Abusive
Exercise of Employer Power, 67 COLUM. L. Rlv. 1404-05 (1967).
9. See Christensen and Svanoe, Motive and Intent in the Commission of Unfair
Labor Practices: The Supreme Court and the Fictive Formality, 77 YALZ L.J. 1269

(1968).
10. Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 11-14 (1883). See also Shelley v. Kraemer,
334 U.S. 1 (1948).
11. Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715 (1961) ; Simkins v.
Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp., 323 F.2d 959 (4th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 376 U.S.
938 (1964); Smith v. Holiday Inns of America, Inc., 220 F. Supp. 1 (M.D. Tenn.
1963), aff'd 336 F.2d 630 (6th Cir. 1964).
12. Public Util. Comm'n v. Pollak, 343 U.S. 451 (1952).
13. Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 19 (1958).
14. Griffin v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 130 (1964) ; Pennsylvania v. Bd. of Directors
of City Trusts, 353 U.S. 230 (1957); Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249 (1953);
Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948) ; Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91 (1945).
15 Exec. Order No. 8802, 3 C.F.R. 957 (Comp. 1938-43).
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enforced in court because of the doctrine of separation of powers.
In the few instances where aggrieved parties did litigate, the courts
held that they had no standing because the contract was a bilateral one
between the government and the company, not a third party beneficiary contract.'
The inescapable conclusion is that the three branches of Government -

the Congress, the Executive, and the Supreme Court -

at

least until 1964, have failed to accord legal recognition to the acquisition and retention of employment. Instead of viewing employment
rights as preferred rights, on the same scale as freedom of speech,
association, religion, etc., the decision-makers have chosen to side
with the institution, not the person. This is an especially sad commentary upon the effectiveness of our legal process when one reflects
upon the fact that it was not at all necessary for the Civil Rights Act
to have been passed, for the legal process already had the power to
rectify most of the wrongs which the Act prohibited. The problem
has always been not a lack of legal power but a refusal to exercisd
that power.

17

It is the purpose of this article to analyze the principal provisions
of Title VII with a view of determining whether this form of statutory protection is adequate in safeguarding the new property - em16.
The right of individuals
contracts provisions till now,
refusal of the courts, so far,
parties beneficiary to enforce

discriminated against, however, in violation of such
has been limited to administrative remedy. The
to apply orthodox notions of the rights of third
contracts made for their benefit in this situation

raises the always perplexing problem of the propriety of using private law concepts to resolve public controversies.
Ming, supra note 2, at 112.
17. "[T]here is an overriding federal responsibility for both policy declaration
and policy implementation in employment discrimination which has been overlooked
on the one hand, and, on the other hand, where power has been perceived it has
remained for the most unexercised." Ferguson, The Federal Interest in Employment
Discrimination: Herein the Constitutional Scope of Executive Power to Withhold
Appropriated Funds, 14 BUVVALO L. Rgv. 1 (1964).
In Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33 (1915), the court recognized the fundamental
value of the right to work:
It is sought to justify this act as an exercise of the power of the State to
make reasonable classifications in legislating to promote the health, safety, morals,
and welfare of those within its jurisdiction. But this admitted authority, with the
broad range of legislative discretion that it implies, does not go so far as to
make it possible for the State to deny to lawful inhabitants, because of their race
or nationality, the ordinary means of earning a livelihood. It requires no argument
to show that the right to work for a living in the common occupations of the
community is of the very essence of the personal freedom and opportunity that it
was the purpose of the Amendment to secure.
Id. at 41.
"It is submitted that the right of Americans to procure employment is fundamental, and is to be distinguished from general business activities which can constitutionally be regulated on an 'any rational basis' showing. Certainly the right to
procure a job - or more precisely the right to have government not impede the
opportunity to freely negotiate a job with an employer, unless in furtherance of some
absolutely OVgRRIDING state policies - would appear to be just as fundamental as the
right to marry, characterized as basic in Loving v. Virginia." Kanowitz, Constitutional
Aspects of Sex-Based Discrimination,48 NEBRASKA L. Rgv. 131, 166 (1969).
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ployment rights - at least in respect to minorities. The success or
failure of Title VII will not depend upon its language, but rather
the interpretation of that language by the federal courts. It is the
contention of this article that employment rights will be protected
and freedom furthered if the courts adopt a liberal view, regarding
discrimination as a public wrong, not a private wrong. In this way,
by viewing acts of discrimination by companies and labor unions as
prima facie wrongs, and by compelling them to come forward with
higher social reasons to justify their discrimination, a significant contribution will 'be made 'by the courts in protecting economic rights.
If, however, the courts are inclined to view acts of discrimination
as private wrongs, demanding specific evidence of -fault or culpability,
upon the part of management and labor unions, the Civil Rights
Act is doomed to failure. This futile quest for "intent," ".malice,"
"culpability," or "state of mind" has crippled the intent of the National
Labor Relations Act more than any other doctrine.'" Institutional
responsibility, not institutional immunity, is the policy of the Civil
Rights Act and as such the courts should balance the effect of the
alleged discrimination against the social weight of the employer's
reasons; not probe into the mind of the employer or union to determine whether they were at fault.
II.

THE PROVISIONS OF TITLE VII

It is necessary before undertaking a critical analysis of Title VII
to briefly examine its provisions. The title is structured upon four
principles: (1) coverage, (2) definition of equal employment opportunity, (3) enforcement procedures, and (4) the initiary power of
Government. The Act covers all employers involved in interstate
commerce which have a work force of 25 or more employees and
labor unions having a membership of 25 or more persons. Despite
this broad coverage over eighteen million workers are not covered
by the Act.
Section 703, like section 7 of the National Labor Relations Act,
is the heart of Title VII. It consists of four subsections defining
the rights of minority groups and six subsections defining institutional
immunities. This section is comprehensive in nature and embraces
virtually every type of unfair employment practice. It makes it an
unlawful employment practice for an employer to hire, to discharge or
in any other way to interfere with the terms and conditions of em18. See Affeldt, Employer Free Speech: The Hostile Motive and Afirmative

Duty Tests, .--

Gto. L.J-.

(.);

see also Christensen and Svanoe, supra note 9.
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ployment of an individual "because of such individual's race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin."1 It is also an unlawful employment
practice for labor unions to deny membership because of race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin, or in any way to interfere with an
individual's status as an employee or prospective employee for these
reasons.2" In a provision identical to section 8(b) (2) of the NLRA,
labor unions are also prohibited from attempting to cause employers
to discriminate.2 ' Employment agencies, too, are forbidden to fail or
refuse to refer for employment or otherwise to discriminate against
any individual because of these reasons or to classify for employment
any individual on such a basis. The same general prohibitions are
also applicable to employers, labor unions, and joint labor-management
committees "controlling apprenticeship or other training or retraining,
including on-the-job training programs."2
These federal employment rights are immediately followed by a
list of institutional immunities, pointing out what Congress considered
not to be unfair employment practices. These immunities are contained in subsections 703(e) to (j). Subsections 703(e)(1), 703(h)
and 703(j) will only be considered here since the other subsections
are of little or no importance. Subsection 703 (e) (1) allows employers,
labor organizations, and employment agencies to discriminate for
reasons of religion, sex, or national origin "in those certain instances
where religion, sex, or national origin is a bona fide occupational qualification reasonably necessary to the normal operation of that particular
business or enterprise." Subsection 703(h) deals with two important
subjects - seniority and -testing. The Act states that it is not an
unlawful employment practice "for an employer to apply different
standards of compensation, or different terms, conditions, or privileges
of employment -pursuant to a bona fide seniority or merit system which
measures earnings by quantity or quality of production or to employees
who work in different locations, provided that such differences are
not the result of an intention to discriminate because of race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin. . .

."

Subsection 703(h) also states

that it is not an unlawful employment practice for an employer "to
give and to act upon the results of any professionally developed ability
test provided that such test, its administration, or action upon the
results is not designed, intended or used to discriminate because of
race, color, religion, sex, or national origin." Finally, subsection 703(j)
19.
20.
21.
22.

Civil
Civil
Civil
Civil

Rights
Rights
Rights
Rights

Act
Act
Act
Act

of
of
of
of

1964,
1964,
1964,
1964,

§ 703(a) (1), 42 U.S.C. § 2000 e-2(a) (1) (1964).
§ 703(c) (1), 42 U.S.C. § 2000 e-2(c) (1) (1964).
§ 703(c) (3), 42 U.S.C. § 2000 e- 2 (c) (3) (1964).
§ 703(d), 42 U.S.C. § 2000 e-2(d) (1964).
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was incorporated into the act to assure congressional skeptics that
employers and labor unions had no affirmative duty to give minority
groups preferential treatment in order to remedy existing racial imbalances in employment. In essence, this means that employers and
labor unions have no duty to maintain racial quotas.
A five man bipartisan Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (E.E.O.C.) is established to (1) administer the Act, (2) conduct research, (3) investigate unlawful employment charges, and (4)
attempt to resolve employment disputes by conciliation.13 After the
expiration of a 60-day deference period, during which the charging
party must exhaust his state or local remedies, he must file his charge
with the Commission. For the Commission to take jurisdiction, it
must receive the charge within 90 days of the alleged unfair employment practice. The Commission, after serving a copy of the charge
to the respondent, must investigate to determine whether there is
reasonable cause. If it determines that reasonable cause exists, it will
then attempt to settle the matter by means of conciliation. If the Commission is successful, it will have both parties sign a conciliation agreement whereby the respondent agrees to eliminate the -unfair employment practices and the charging party agrees, in return for certain
benefits, to waive his right to sue.
If the Commission, however, is unsuccessful in obtaining a conciliation agreement, it must then inform the charging party who then
has 30 days from the receipt of notice to commence a civil action in
the federal court. Although a charge may be filed by a member of
the Commission, and any person aggrieved under the charge may
bring an action ,in
court, the Commission itself cannot initiate a complaint in court. The court in its discretion may appoint an attorney
for the plaintiff and may authorize the commencement of the action
without payment of court fees, costs, or security. The court also has
discretion to award attorney fees to the prevailing party.
The federal courts are the -exclusive enforcers of Title VII in a
trial de novo. The Act grants broad enforcement powers to the
courts. They may grant "such affirmative action as may be appropriate," such as injunctions, reinstatement, back-pay, modified seniority
plans, objective testing procedures, etc. 4 Also the court may permit
the Attorney General to intervene if the Justice Department feels the
case is of "general public importance." 25
23. Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000 e-4, e-5 (1964).
24. Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000 e-5(g) (1964).
25. Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 706(e), 42 U.S.C. § 2000 e-5(e) (1964).
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The Attorney General's real power, however, lies in his ability
to initiate a civil action when he has reasonable cause to believe that
any institution is engaged in a "pattern or practice of resistance,"
which interferes with the rights granted by Title VII. 26 Unlike an
individual complainant who must exhaust his administrative remedies,
the Attorney General can bypass the state and Commission and go
directly to court. Also, if he certifies that the case is of "general
public importance" he can ask for a three-judge panel and for an
immediate trial.27
This in substance is the gist of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964. On the surface one might receive the impression that Congress made a heroic effort to bestow first class citizenship upon
minority groups. Beneath the surface, however, within the crevices,
there is language of "intention," the language of private law. The
enforcement section, section 7 0 6 (g) states that judicial relief is forthcoming only if the court finds that "the respondent has intentially
engaged in, or is intentionally engaging in an unlawful employment
practice." 2 If the courts strictly interpret this section so as to require
specific evidence of a respondent's state of mind, then Title VII will
be doomed to ineffectiveness. Also, if the courts view the charging
party's suit as a private suit, with no public interest, the Title is
again doomed. The success or failure of Title VII lies in its enforcement by the federal courts - whether they will view discrimination
as a private or a public wrong. Accordingly, this article will deal
with the enforcement provisions of Title VII with the purpose of
urging the courts to adopt a public law approach to both the procedural and substantive aspects of Title VII.
III.

DISCRIMINATION

Is

A PUBLIC WRONG

Of all the types of discrimination which the Civil Rights Act
prohibits, the most difficult to detect and to enforce is discrimination
in employment. This is "an area in which subtleties of conduct play
no small part."2 It is relatively easy for an employer or labor union
to set up artificial barriers where it is exceedingly difficult for the law
to penetrate. The principal reason that it is much easier for an employer or union to discriminate within a factory than, for instance,
an educational institution or a public accommodation is because of the
many institutional interests an employer or union can hide behind. Any
26. Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 707(a), 42 U.S.C. § 2000 e-6(a) (1964).

27. Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 707(b), 42 U.S.C. § 2000 e-6(b) (1964).
28. Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 706(g), 42 U.S.C. § 2000 e-5(g) (1964)
phasis added).

(em-

29. Holland v. Edwards, 307 N.Y. 38, 45, 119 N.E.2d 581, 584 (1954).
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effective legislation, therefore, seeking to root out employment discrimi-

nation should establish a strong administrative enforcement machinery
which is speedy, efficient, and well-armed with sanctions. It is ironic
that Congress, well aware of this problem, instead of taking as its
model a strong administrative agency as the National Labor Relations
Board, took as its model weak Fair Employment Practices state
agencies whose record is a long one of failure."0
Originally, during the early drafting stages, the House did look
to the NLRB as its model. It created a Commission, like the Labor
Board, which had quasi-judicial powers and which possessed the aul
t-hority to issue cease and desist orders enforceable by the courts.

Even though the House Judiciary Committee chipped away at this
enforcement power by limiting the Commission's role to that of a
prosecutor, the administrative aspect of the Bill was still strong. When
the Bill reached the Senate, however, Title VII's enforcement provi-

sions, especially the Commission's powers, were more bitterly attacked than any other portion of the Act.
The result of the "leadership compromise" was -to strip the Commission of all its enforcement powers, 'both its quasi-judicial and its
prosecution functions.32 Control over the enforcement of unfair employment practices - access ito the courts - was taken from the Commission and placed under the exclusive control of the charging party.
This compromise, in effect, reduced the role of the Commission from
that of a strong enforcer to that of a silent mediator. And, as will be
pointed out, the agency's principal function today is that of issuing
30. "State and local agencies have made at most modest progress in eliminating
discrimination by employers. They have exerted even less impact upon discriminatory
union practices." Comment, Enforcement of Fair Employment Under the Civil Rights
Act of 1964, 32 U. CI.
L. Rev. 430, 442 (1965). See also Hill, Twenty Years of
State Fair Employment Practice Commissions: A Critical Analysis with Recommendations, 14 BUFVALO L. REv. 22 (1964).
State experience suggests that settlements of individual complaints by the
Commission itself are likely to be infrequent. A nearly identical state agency
in Kansas which also was restricted to investigation and confidential mediation
was so ineffectual that after eight years the statute was redrawn. Parallel experiences with non-enforceable acts in Indiana, Baltimore and Cleveland confirm that
voluntary programs are generally ineffective. Most aggrieved individuals will
probably attempt to avoid the Commission or, at best, will regard it as a
mandatory intermediate stage in the enforcement process.
Comment, supra at 436-37. Footnote 44 in this article states: "Between 1953 and 1960
the agency was unable to reach an adjustment with twenty-one of twenty-two employers it approached until it called upon the President's Committee on Government
Contracts for assistance." 1960 KANSAS ANTI-DISCRIMINATION COMMISSION REPORT
OF PROGRESS 12; see also 1961 REPORT oF PROGRESS 11. The law was amended in
1961 to enable the Commission not only to hold hearings and issue cease-and-desist
orders but also to order an employer to hire or reinstate a complainant with back pay.
GEN. STATS. KAN. §§ 44-1001-04 (Supp. 1961).
31. H.R. 405, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. #9(j), 109 CONG. REc. 13009 (1963).
32. 110 CONG. Rgc. 13693 (daily ed. June 17, 1964).
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tickets to charging parties for admission to the main event in federal
court.
This -limitation of the Commission's power to the task of conciliation instigated a barrage of criticism from commentators. 8 Many
saw the Act as a paper tiger designed not for minority groups, but
as a political device to ease national and international tensions. "[T]he
Negro in America had been mediating and conciliating over 150 years.
He has little faith in the process nor should he." 4 The NAACP advised victims of discrimination to bring their charges before the NLRB,
3

not the Commission.

5

There is much truth in these criticisms. It is difficult not to
escape the conclusion that Congress had no intention of setting up
a high powered administrative agency to enforce the Act. To accuse
Congress of a hollow commitment to civil liberties is an overstatement, but nevertheless "[m]ake no mistake about it. The enforcement
system created by Title VII was a deliberate choice of court over
administrative agency as the type of institution in which the adjudicative power should be vested. The legislative history with its progressive withdrawal of the Commission from an adjudicative role, makes
this abundantly clear."3 "
It is my conviction as a former conciliator for the EEOC that
the conciliatory method is indeed a frail weapon, especially when it
is employed against the large economic giants of the nation. The
smaller companies tend to fear the consequences of unsuccessful conciliation - such informal sanctions as unfavorable publicity, problems
with civil rights groups, possible initiation of a civil suit with attendant economic losses, such as back pay and attorney fees, etc.
With the -large company, however, the conciliator has little or no bargaining power. Appeals to persuasion, to the company's sense of
social responsibility are usually fruitless. The large company and the
large labor union usually feel that they have more to gain through
litigation than through conciliation. These large institutions realize
that the litigation process favors them, making the battle a David
and Goliath contest. While the defense of such a suit is only a slight
inconvenience to the respondent's legal staff, its initiation involves
33. Cooksey, The Role of Law in Equal Employment Opportunity, 7 B.C. IND.
& CoM. L. Rev. 417 (1966); Rachlin, Title VII: Limitations and Qualifications,7 B.C.
IND. & CoM. L. Rxv. 473 (1966); Schmidt, Title VII: Coverage and Comments,
7 B.C. IND. & CoM. L. Rsv. 459 (1966).
34. Schmidt, supra note 33, at 460.
35. On the day the National Labor Relations Board announced its decision in the
Hughes Tool case, stating it would regard race discrimination as an unfair labor
practice, the NAACP advised its members to bypass the Commission for the NLRB.
36. Walker, Title VII: Complaint and Enforcement Procedures and Relief and
Remedies, 7 B.C. IND. & CoM. L. Rsv. 495, 522 (1966).
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considerable burdens, such as expense, delay, and uncertainty, to the
plaintiff. The very nature of employment discrimination demands
urgency, but the large organizations take advantage of the law's delay
to break down the charging party's resistance. At first, during the
early days of the Act, this unhesitancy upon the part of the large
organizations to litigate was not present, largely because of their relative unfamiliarity with the law and the fear of unfavorable publicity,
but today they are more prone to litigate than conciliate.
Regardless of its defective administrative machinery, however,
it is possible for Title VII to be an effective instrument of social reform and fulfill its objective of granting first class citizenship to
minority groups if the federal courts view the title as a public act,
not a private one. Title VII has 'been referred to as having a "split
personality." "' At various times it has been termed a private, 88 a quasipublic, 39 and a public Act. 40 This language of private and quasi-public
should be abandoned for it is clear, notwithstanding Congressional
rejection of effective administrative machinery, that Congress had no
intention to privatize Title VII. Instead, it ordered another federal
enforcement agency, the courts, to fashion and apply public federal
law.
It is virtually impossible to speak of discrimination as only invasions of private rights. Economic invasions of personality transcend
the rights of the victim; they directly touch all members of his class
and indirectly the entire community. Invidious discrimination by
its very nature is a public wrong. Any attempt upon the part of the
37. Hall v. Werthan Bag Corp., 251 F. Supp. 184, 187 (M.D. Tenn. 1966).
38. Probably the most significant change made in Title VII by the leadership
compromise was to deprive the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission of
the right to bring suits to enforce compliance with the title and to substitute an
individual right of action by the person aggrieved ....
This represented a rather
basic change in the philosophy of the title and implied an appraisal of discrimination in employment as a private rather than a public wrong, a wrong, to be sure,
which entitles the damaged party to judicial relief, but not one so injurious to the
community as to justify the intervention of the public law enforcement authorities.
Berg, Equal Employment Opportunity under the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 31
BROOKLYN L. lRv. 62, 67 (1964).
39. Congressional modification of the bill clearly indicated a shift in the emphasis
of Title VII toward the vindication of individual rights since the burden of
enforcement was placed on the individual rather than on the commission. But
this shift in emphasis does not by itself remove the basic public interest in the
elimination of discrimination in employment. Consequently, in view of the chaotic
legislative history of Title VII, it would be futile to attempt to analyze the
enforcement provision in terms of vindicating only a public or a private right.
Rather, a practical approach to an analysis of section 706(g) must recognize that
the bill's metamorphosis was not complete and that the final statutory scheme
actually is a blend of both private and public interests.
Note, 46 TxXAS L. Rtv. 516, 521 (1968).
40. Blumrosen, The Duty of Fair Recruitment under the Civil Rights Act of 1964,
22 RUTGERS L. Rzv. 465 (1968).
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decision makers to view it as a private wrong would be contrary to
the economy of justice, for it would result in a multiplicity of suits
involving the same facts and the same law.
The inner logic and structure of Title VII is directed primarily
not to the protection of private rights but to the protection of the
public interest in the elimination of all discriminatory employment
practices. Congress recognized this public interest when it encouraged
charging parties to litigate 'by permitting courts to appoint attorneys
for them. It also recognized this interest when it permitted the Attorney
General to initiate suits against institutions which engaged in practices
detrimental to the Act's policy. Also, other defenders of the public
interest may unilaterally act to prohibit and prevent discrimination.
A commissioner may file a charge against an organization; the Office
of Federal Contract Compliance may institute proceedings on the
basis of non-discriminatory clauses in government contracts.
The Commission itself, although deprived of its primary enforcement powers, still continues to exercise public functions. The charging
party must initially file a charge with the Commission and cannot
without Commission approval withdraw the charge." At the trial itself, the Commission may intervene by filing an amicus 'curiae brief.
Also, after trial, if the charging party prevails, the Commission is
entrusted with the task of supervising the court's order and may, if
necessary, sue to compel compliance.2
The public nature of Title VII is also seen in the broad enforcement powers which Congress granted to the courts. These expansive
and flexible powers in section 7 0 6 (g) closely resemble the broad
powers contained in section 10(c) of the National Labor Relations
Act, which were designed not primarily for private parties but for
groups. Also, it would appear that if Title VII were designed to
remedy only private wrongs, the award of back pay, for instance,
would be considered mandatory because of a violation of a private
right. Back pay, however, like the provision in section 10(c) of the
NLRA is discretionary with the court and as such betrays a congressional intent to award it only to effectuate the purposes of the Act.
In two recent important decisions the United States Supreme
Court and the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals have unequivocally declared that Title VII should be interpreted in a broad, public spirit.
In Newman v. Piggy Park Enterprises,Inc.,43 the Supreme Court in
41. 29 C.F.R. § 1601.9 (1969).
42. Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 706(i), 42 U.S.C. § 2000 e-5(i) (1964).
43. 390 U.S. 400 (1968).
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a Title II suit, later held applicable to Title VII," formulated the
principle that private charging parties represented not only 'their own
interests but that of the public. The court said:
A Title II suit is thus private in form only. . . . If he [the
plaintiff] obtains an injunction, he does so not for himself alone,
but also as a "private attorney general," vindicating a policy that
Congress considered of the highest priority.4"
In Jenkins v. United Gas Corp.,46 the charging party alleged that
he was not promoted because of his race. The Commission found
reasonable cause to believe the charge was true. The District Court,
however, dismissed the complaint as moot when the employer demonstrated that the plaintiff had been promoted after the suit was filed.
On appeal to the Fifth Circuit, the Commission argued that the suit
was more than a private suit but one which affected the public interest.
The court's decision, the Commission urged, did not effectuate the
policy of the Act by eliminating the employer's institutional discriminatory practices which injured others. The Court agreed, stating:
The suit is therefore more than a private claim by the employee seeking the particular job which is at the bottom of the
charge of unlawful discrimination filed with EEOC. When conciliation has failed - either outright or by reason of the expiration of the statutory timetable - that individual, often obscure,
takes on the mantel of the sovereign. Newman v. Piggie Park
7
Enterprises."
This mandate from the Supreme Court that ,the charging party
is a private attorney general protecting not only his individual interest
but that of his class and the public seems clear, but, as will be pointed
out, many federal courts prefer to regard it as mere rhetoric. This
matter of interpretation of Title VII is important. The courts will be
closely watched. Many critics maintain that the courts are not suitable institutions for experiments in social reform, but they are intent
finders, not fact finders. They are designed, it is said, to resolve
individual interactions of ,the 19th century -

private law -

not to

44. In Oatis v. Crown Zellerbach Corp., 398 F.2d 496, 499 (5th Cir. 1968), the
court after referring to Newman v. Piggie Park Enterprises, Inc., said:
Clearly, the same logic applies to Title VII of the Act. Racial discrimination
is by definition class discrimination, and to require a multiplicity of separate,
identical charges before the EEOC, filed against the same employer, as a
prerequisite to relief through resort to the court would tend to frustrate our
system of justice and order.
45. Newman v. Piggie Park Enterprises, Inc., 390 U.S. 400, 401-02 (1968).
46. 400 F.2d 28 (5th Cir. 1968), reversing 261 F. Supp. 762 (E.D. Tex. 1966).
47. Id. at 32.
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resolve group interactions of the 20th century - public law.4" For
the most part the record supports this criticism. The federal courts
by attempting to privatize such statutes such as the NLRA by demanding evidence of intent instead of balancing interests have frustrated congressional policy.49
It is not easy to predict how the courts will interpret Title VII,
but it is easy to predict that if the courts interpret it as a private statute, the trend of the 20th century - administrative adjudication over
judicial adjudication - will continue unabated.
IV.

JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION OF TITLE

A.
1.

VII

ProceduralProblems

The Right to Sue

Most of the court decisions, as one would expect in the interpretation of a new statute, have centered around the procedural aspects of
Title VII. The principal procedural question so far has been - what
are the prerequisites for suing in federal court? Can the charging
party bypass the Commission and sue directly in court or must he
exhaust his administrative remedies before the Commission? Section
706(a) states that the Commission shall investigate all charges and
if it finds reasonable cause to believe respondent committed an unlawful employment practice, it shall attempt to conciliate ,the dispute. Section 706(e) states that if the Commission is unable "to obtain voluntary compliance with this title" within thirty days (this period of
time may be extended to sixty days), it must then notify the charging
party who then has the right to bring suit.
It appears from a literal interpretation of section 706(e) that
Congress directed the Commission to investigate, find reasonable cause
and to conciliate within a maximum period of sixty days. Uncontrollable events, however, such as the avalanche of charges, the Com48. Are the courts suitable institutions for the enforcement of laws, especially

laws which are designed to effect basic rearrangements in de facto and de jure
relationships in society? The modern tendency, which is especially though not
exclusively found on the federal level, has been to give to administrative agencies
rather than to courts the power to issue initial enforcement orders which have
the character of adjudicative decision. This can only be taken as evidence of
disaffection with the courts as effective institutions for the administration of laws
of social reform. . . . If the efforts to give the commission powers of administrative adjudication are not immediately successful, the record of the trial courts
in enforcing Title VII may well prove to be a kind of institutional testing ground
for the future role of courts at the trial level in the social reform process. If
the courts fail in their task, the proponents of future reform laws can be expected
to fight even harder for administrative adjudication.
Walker, Title VII: Complaint and Enforcement Procedures and Relief and Remedies,
7 B.C. IND. & CoM. L. Rev. 495, 522 (1965).
49. See Affeldt, supra note 18.
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mission's limited staff, its small budget, and the extensive amount of
time involved in investigating and conciliating made this an impossible
task. In the practical order, it takes the Commission about two years
to process a case. A strict interpretation would militate against the
policy of the Act in that it would deprive charging parties, whom
the Commission had not notified within the sixty-day time period,
of their cause of action and would strike against the congressional intent of encouraging private settlement over litigation.
In Dent v. St. Louis-San Francisco Ry.,5 ° the respondent argued
for a literal interpretation of section 703(e). He maintained that
since the suits were not brought within the ninety-day period (sixty
days for Commission action and thirty days for plaintiff to sue)
and because there was no actual conciliation by the Commission,
plaintiff's action should be dismissed. The District Court disagreed
with the first contention. It said: "[T]he sixty-day time period provided for the investigation and conciliation of charges is properly to
be accorded a directory rather than a mandatory construction."'" It
agreed with the respondent's second contention, however, saying that
some actual conciliation by the Commission was a jurisdictional condition for suit.
The Fifth Circuit agreed with the District Court on the first
point, but reversed it on the second point. The Court said:
[Section 703(e)] very clearly sets out only two requirements for
an aggrieved party before he can initiate his action in the United
States District Court: (1) he must file a charge with the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission and (2) he must receive
the statutory notice from the Commission that it has been unable
to obtain voluntary compliance. It is extremely important in
these cases that both the spirit and the letter of Title VII reflect
an unequivocal intent on the part of Congress to create a right
of action in the aggrieved employee. The dismissal of these cases
deprived the aggrieved employee of that right of action, not because of some failure on his part to comply with the requirement
of the Title, but for the Commission's failure to conciliate - a
failure that was and will always be beyond the control of the
5 2
aggrieved party.

Outside of a few scattered cases, the federal courts are in agreement that a charging party in order to sue in court need only obtain
a ticket in the form of a thirty-day letter from the Commission. 3 The
50. 265 F. Supp. 56 (N.D. Ala. 1967).
51. Id. at 58.
52. Dent v. St. Louis-San Francisco Ry., 406 F.2d 399, 403 (5th Cir. 1969).
53. Those decisions in accord with the Fifth Circuit's decision in Dent are:
Sokolowski v. Swift & Co., 286 F. Supp. 775 (D. Minn. 1968) ; Reese v. Atlantic
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charging party has two alternatives on when to obtain this ticket. He
can wait for his thirty day letter, giving the Commission an opportunity
to conciliate his case, or he can request it sixty days after he filed
his charge with the Commission. When this request is made, the Commission even if it has made no effort to investigate his case, must issue
54
it to him.
2.

Technical ProceduralDefenses

Many attorneys for respondents are seizing upon technical procedural points in an attempt to dismiss actions brought by charging
parties. Many of these technical defenses are based upon the proposition that non-compliance with administrative procedures defeats the
jurisdiction of the courts. It is difficult to understand how the district
courts can seriously entertain these arguments because under Title VII
the courts act in a de novo capacity, not as reviewing agencies for
administrative boards. For the courts to assume jurisdiction, it is
only necessary for the charging party to file a charge and receive a
thirty day letter; no party has a right to investigation and conciliation.
The right to a hearing is satisfied by the court. To place a premium
upon administrative technicality within this empty framework is to
frustrate the policy of the Act. The respondent, if he has a legitimate
objection to administrative procedures, should object to the Commission, not to the court.5 5
In Choate v. Caterpillar Tractor Co.,"0 the District Court dismissed plaintiff's complaint because he did not allege that his charge
was made "under oath" as dictated by section 706(a), despite a CoinSteel Co., 282 F. Supp. 905 (N.D. Ga. 1967) ; Choate v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 274
F. Supp. 776 (S.D. Ill. 1967) ; Quarles v. Phillip Morris, Inc., 271 F. Supp. 842
(E.D. Va. 1967); Mondy v. Crown Zellerbach Corp., 271 F. Supp. 258 (E.D. La.
1967) ; Moody v. Albermarle Paper Co., 271 F. Supp. 27 (E.D.N.C. 1967) ; Evanson
v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 268 F. Supp. 29 (E.D. Va. 1967); Centra-Cunningham
v. Litton Indus., 66 L.R.R.M. 2697 (C.D. Cal. 1967).
54. This [notice] is particularly true where the Commission's rule provides that
such notice may be obtained on request any time after termination of the sixty
(60) day period. Both the statutes and regulations provide for such notice. The
statute provides that it "shall" issue after a maximum of sixty (60) days, and
the regulations provide that it "shall" issue after sixty (60) days upon request
by either party. . . . Only in exceptional circumstances may this requirement be
waived. If a plaintiff can state that he waited sixty (60) days, and properly
demanded that such notice be issued but that the Commission failed or refused
to issue the notice, then a suit might be commenced.
Cox v. United States Gypsum Co., 284 F. Supp. 74, 83 (N.D. Ind. 1968).
55. "To permit such an objection to be raised for the first time as a defense to an
action under section 706 violates the principle that objections to procedural irregularities must be made in the course of the administrative proceeding and may not be
made for the first time in the courts." Berg, Title VII: A Three Year's View, 44
NOTRE DAME LAWYER

311, 321 (1969).

56. 274 F. Supp. 776 (S.D. Ill. 1967).
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mission regulation which stated that defective charges could be amended
to cure defects., 7 The Seventh Circuit reversed, saying:
Enforcement of the rights of aggrieved parties resides exclusively in the federal courts. When the statute is thus considered,
it is clear that the requirement for verification of charges lodged
with the Commission relates solely to the administrative rather
than to the judicial features of the statute. We believe that the
provision is directory and technical rather than mandatory and
substantive.""
It is fatal and rightly so for the charging party to fail to name
the respondent in the charge before the Commission. Many times
the charging party fails to name the union or only names the local
and not the international union. 9 In a true sense the respondent's
statutory rights are violated because the Commission never had the
opportunity to conciliate the dispute. It is not fatal, however, even
though the statute directs it, for the Commission to delay serving a
copy of the charge upon the respondent until the investigatory stage.
The courts while critical of this practice will not permit the delay to
destroy the jurisdiction of the plaintiff's claim.6" The courts also view
with great liberality the language of a charge, recognizing that most
charges are drawn up by working people unaccustomed to the niceties
of language employed by professional people.6 1
Under Title VII the aggrieved party has ninety days from the
alleged act of discrimination to file a charge with the Commission.
This provision, while appearing to be self-evident, is extremely complex. The difficulty lies not in counting the days but in determining
what is a continuing violation. The NLRB's policy that most racial
discriminatory acts are continuing in nature gives a tremendous ad57.
58.
59.
60.

29 C.F.R. § 1601.11 (1967).
Choate v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 402 F.2d 357, 359 (7th Cir. 1968).
Sokolowski v. Swift & Co., 286 F. Supp. 775 (D. Minn. 1968).
Pullen v. Otis Elevator Co., 292 F. Supp. 715 (N.D. Ga. 1968).
It is noted that under the statutory scheme, the EEOC investigation and procedure is a supplementary element in plaintiff's action. While it is a procedural
and jurisdictional prerequisite [see Mondy v. Crown Zellerbach Corp., 271 F. Supp.
258, 66 L.R.R.M. 2721 (E.D. La. 1967)], it is not a substantive part of plaintiff's
right. Therefore, this court is not persuaded that EEOC's administrative delay
should be allowed to destroy the jurisdiction of plaintiff's claim, despite EEOC's
clear violation of the obvious statutory intent that a defendant be timely apprised
of action against him.
Id. at 717. See also Local 5, IBEW v. EEOC, 398 F.2d 248 (3d Cir. 1968).
61. In Antonopulous v. Aerojet-General Corp., 70 L.R.R.M. 2666 (E.D. Cal.
1968), the court said:
We are not dealing with businessmen-plaintiffs or plaintiffs accustomed to
consulting lawyers about their rights. This law is a remedial one, and the Congressional purpose would not be furthered by making plaintiffs of the kind with
which we are concerned, members of the working class who are generally without
substantial higher education, dot every "i" and cross every "t" on their way
to the courthouse.
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vantage to aggrieved parties.62 They may file at any time. The courts,
however, under Title VII relying upon a strained interpretation of
the EEOC's general counsel's interpretation of the ninety-day proviso
have literally interpreted this section.6" In general, the courts have
disfavored continuing violations. 4 One court in a somewhat puzzling
decision held that the discriminatory act was completed at the time
of the act, before the employee pursued his remedies under the collective bargaining contract. 5 The correct decision would appear to be
to view the act as a continuing violation until the final decision of
the arbitrator.
The inherent conservatism of some courts in interpreting Title
VII is illustrated in those decisions which restrict litigation only to
those charges which the charging party filed before the Commission."6
This is a disturbing trend and serves to point to the fact that many
courts view Title VII as a private statute. The judicial rationale is
that a plaintiff who attempts to litigate charges in court which he
did not file before the Commission is in the same position as an aggrieved party who never appeared before the Commission because
"[t] he EEOC cannot investigate allegations which have not been filed
in writing under oath under section 706(a)." 7
This language is not only the language of technical jargon, but
it also carries a false analogy. Investigators and conciliators often
discover added instances or dimensions of discrimination and these
62. Steelworkers Local 2401, 52 LAB. R-L. RgW. 247 (1963).
63. A letter dated August 19, 1966, and released September 14, 1966, stated:
The 90 day time period within which to file a complaint of discriminatory
discharge begins to run upon complete termination of the employment status.
This limitation cannot be waived, unless it can be shown that employment status
continued pending a final review by management and that the complaint was filed
within 90 days of the final review of exhaustion of grievance procedures.
64. Cox v. United States Gypsum Co., 284 F. Supp. 74 (N.D. Ind. 1968).
65. The court concludes that the failure by the company to award the job on
March 28, 1967, was not continuing but was a completed act when effected. This
is true because complainant's right to file a charge with Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission accrued immediately, without regard to union contract,
grievance procedure, or any unofficial reconsideration by management. There is
no known authority to the effect that a failure to rectify an alleged unlawful act
converts it into a continuing transaction or suspends the 90-day period.
Culpepper v. Reynolds Metals Co., 70 L.R.R.M. 2360, 2362 (N.D. Ga. 1969).
66. In Cox v. United States Gypsum Co., 284 F. Supp. 74 (N.D. Ind. 1968), the
court said:
This passage (Title 42 U.S.C. § 2000 e-5 (a)) clearly indicates that the commission is confined to the charge that was filed by the charging party and is not
given carte blanche to investigate all activities of the respondent. Thus, here
where several of the plaintiffs have limited their charge against the company to
a claim of discriminatory layoffs, both the commission and the court are limited
to a consideration of that charge.
Id. at 79.
67. Edwards v. North Am. Rockwell Corp., 291 F. Supp, 199, 204 (C.D. Cal.
1968). In King v. Georgia Power Co., 69 L.R.R.M. 2094 (N.D. Ga. 1968), the court
took a more liberal view. It held that an employee bringing a civil rights suit against
his employer is entitled to litigate all issues he had standing to raise before the EEOC
not merely the issues he did raise.
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acts or patterns of discrimination are made part of the conciliation
agreement. If, as often happens, the respondent objects to the incorporation of these provisions in the conciliation agreement, he is informed that a future Commissioner's charge will only succeed in
lengthening the process. The point here is that there is a profound
difference between the status of a person who never appeared before
the Commission and one who has appeared but who failed to incorporate
all the discriminatory acts in his charge. In the latter instance, the
Commission had an opportunity to conciliate.
The policy of the Act is not furthered by the courts taking this
restrictive and legalized view of discrimination. If, as the Supreme
Court has said, the aggrieved person is a "private attorney general"
who alone possesses the key to the courtroom door, then it seems that
he should Tbe able to use that key to open not only some doors in
the factory but all such doors. The charges filed with the Commission should not be regarded as static, their range being determined
by the wrong to the charging party, but should be viewed as public
charges expanding with the range of investigation and conciliation.
This policy causes no harm to the respondent, for he is aware of his
discriminatory practices and had an opportunity to conciliate them.
Little is to be gained by the court's private wrong approach, except
to invite a flood of repetitious litigation initiated by other charging
parties or the Commission.
Another procedural problem of the same magnitude is also beginning to assume a private law shape. This is the problem of "election
of remedies." In many instances where the union has a collective bargaining agreement with a company, a single act of discrimination may
give rise to two remedies: (1) a contractual right under the grievance
procedure and (2) a statutory right under Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act.
The federal courts agree that the charging party has no duty
to exhaust his contractual rights prior to filing a charge with the
Commission. 68 Beyond consensus on this point, however, little else is
clear. In Bowe v. Colgate-Palmolive Co.,"9 the District Court, at
the beginning of trial, compelled the plaintiff to elect to proceed either
under Title VII or under the grievance procedure of the collective
bargaining agreement. The court reasoned that the employment of
both remedies would unduly harass the company. Other courts have
refused to force plaintiffs to make an election initially but hold that
68. Dent v. St. Louis-San Francisco Ry., 265 F. Supp. 56 (N.D. Ala. 1967);
Reese v. Atlantic Steel Co., 282 F. Supp. 905 (N.D. Ga. 1967).
69. 272 F. Supp. 332 (S.D. Ind. 1967).
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a final decision or relief in one forum precludes a suit or relief in
the other forum."
These decisions by the courts are not so important for what
they say, -but for what they reveal. And they reveal that many federal
courts are viewing discrimination as a private wrong. On the surface
this judicial doctrine of election of remedies has a glittering appeal.
The plaintiff has only suffered one wrong and has had his day in
court or before an arbitrator. It would be understandable how the
court formulated such a doctrine, that is, if there were only two parties
involved. But what the courts have overlooked is that there are three
parties - the participants and the public.
There is no guarantee that an arbitrator will consider plaintiff's
statutory rights. In fact, there is every guarantee that he will ignore
them, for it is his function to focus exclusively on the contract - the
intent of the parties - without resort to any interests outside the
factory community. The issues before the arbitrator and the Commission are completely different. 71 Even if the arbitrator grants relief
to the plaintiff, this relief is only predicated upon a violation of a
private right, not a public right. The public interest in the prohibition
of discrimination is still unsatisfied. Expiation still has not been made.
If the courts continue to insist that a charging party waives his
statutory right by going to arbitration, they will be defying not only
the law of labor relations, the policy of Title VII, but also possibly
interfering with constitutional rights. In the law of labor relations
the policy of concurrent jurisdiction prevails; the NLRB and the
courts may overrule the decision of an arbitrator.72 Also, the policy
of Title VII would be frustrated -

judicial enforcement -

because

under the courts' rationale it would be possible for employers and
labor unions through their collective bargaining agreements to oust
70. Washington v. Aerojet-General Corp., 282 F. Supp. 517 (C.D. Cal. 1968);

Edwards v. North Am. Rockwell Corp., 291 F. Supp. 199 (C.D. Cal. 1968).
71. In United Steelworkers v. American Int'l Aluminum Corp., 334 F.2d 147
(5th Cir. 1964), a case arising under the National Labor Relations Act, the court said:
[Tihe employer for the most part labors under the fallacy of assuming that
by the Board proceeding and arbitration, the Union is seeking to enforce a single
right in two forums. Actually, there are quite separate rights involving separate
legal and factual issues. In the arbitration proceeding, the Union is seeking to
enforce the right of employees not to be discharged "unjustly." On the other
hand, what is at issue in the Labor Board proceeding is the statutory right of
employees. . . . [Olnce the complaint is issued the Board proceeding takes on
a public character in which remedies are devised to vindicate the policies of the
Labor Act, not afford private relief to employees.
Id. at 152.
72. In Carey v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 375 U.S. 261, 272 (1964), the court said:
Should the Board disagree with the arbiter . . . the Board's ruling would, of
course, take precedence; and if the employer's action had been in accord with
that ruling, it would not be liable for damages under § 301. . . . The superior
authority of the Board may be invoked at any time. Meanwhile the therapy of
arbitration is brought to bear in a complicated and troubled area.
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the courts of their jurisdiction. In the recent case of Dewey v. Reynolds
Metals Co., 73 the District Court saw the constitutional dangers of the

doctrine of election of remedies. In this case, an employee was discharged for refusing to work on Sundays because of religious reasons.
He protested, chose the grievance procedure and the arbitrator found
against him. The court rejected respondent's election of remedy defense. It held that the arbitration process is public in nature.
Since the arbitration tribunal or arbitration proceedings are
in many instances a substitute for traditional judicial remedies,
it follows that the rules of due process and other constitutional
protections must extend to the substitute proceedings lest the
courts, through approval of arbitration agreements in arbitration
proceedings, support proceedings which result in the deprivation
of statutory and constitutional rights. If this grievance - arbitration system, which exists as a result of court approval, is permitted to dispose of disputes involving substantial rights without
heeding constitutional protections, the courts will find themselves
supporting and giving credence to decisions, which if rendered by
the courts would be a violation of the free exercise of religion
Amendment or some other essential constituclause of the First
74
tional protection.

The right to work, to be free from invidious discrimination, is
too important a right to be left to arbitrators in the private arena.
If the Act is to be effectively enforced plaintiff should be entitled
to pursue both contractual and statutory remedies.
3.

Class Suits

Early in the history of the Act, the courts decided that a plaintiff could bring a class action because Title VII protects both private
75
and public interests.
Racial discrimination is by definition a class discrimination.
If it exists, it applies throughout the class. .

.

. But although the

actual effects of a discriminatory policy may thus vary throughout
the class, the existence of a discriminatory policy threatens the
entire class.76
73. 69 L.R.R.M. 2601 (W.D. Mich. 1968).
74. Dewey v. Reynolds Metals Co., 69 L.R.R.M. 2601, 2604 (N.D. Mich. 1968).
At page 2603, the court emphasized there was nothing inconsistent in the two remedies.
It is understandable that any union member would first proceed to raise any
rights he felt were due him under the contract. Proceeding first through arbitraPlaintiff should not be penalized
tion is in accord with federal labor law....
for first proceeding with his contractual remedies through the arbitration process,
as preferred and indeed mandated by federal labor law. He should retain his
When rights of this type are inrights to also bring a civil rights action ....
volved, they outweigh the interest of the company-defendant in avoiding the
inconvenience and expense of multiple actions.
75. Newman v. Piggie Park Enterprises, Inc., 390 U.S. 400 (1968).
76. Hall v. Werthan Bag Corp., 251 F. Supp. 184, 186 (M.D. Tenn. 1966).
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The Fifth Circuit in Oatis v. Crown Zellerbach Corp.,77 elaborated
upon the requirements of a class action. It stated three conditions.
First the class action must . . . meet the requirements of

Rule 23(a) and (b) (2). Next, the issues that may be raised
by plaintiff in such a class action are those issues that he has
standing to raise (i.e., the issues as to which he is aggrieved,
see §706(a) supra) and that he has raised in the charge filed with
the EEOC pursuant to §706(a). 78
The third requirement, that the plaintiff must previously have
raised each issue before the Commission, has given much trouble.
The Fifth Circuit itself has liberally interpreted this requirement.
Realizing that charging parties usually prepare their own charges,
the court said: "All that is required is that it give sufficient information to enable EEOC to see what the grievance is about."7 9 This
problem, however, of whether a class action can expand the scope of
the original charge is far from settled. In Colbert v. H. K. Corp.,80
plaintiff charged that the company refused to hire her because of
her race. In a class action suit against the company, she also alleged
that the company discriminated against its employees in job discrimination and classification. The court dismissed the class action because
as a non-employee she was not a member of the employee class. The
court said:
Moreover, the members of the class, as opposed to the representative of the class who has filed a complaint with the EEOC,
must proceed within the periphery of the issues which the plaintiff could assert. Thus, it is clear that this plaintiff cannot represent the 20 Negro employees of defendant who are allegedly
discriminated against in terms of job promotion and job classification. Moreover, only that aspect of the case dealing with the
question of discriminatory practices in hiring and seeking injunctive relief supports a class action."'
In Carr v. Conoco Plastics, Inc.,12 another District Court took a
different view. In this case Negro applicants for employment brought
a class action alleging that .the employer not only denied them employment because of their race but also that he maintained within the
plant segregated jobs and segregated facilities. The court dismissed
77. 398 F.2d 496 (5th Cir. 1968).

78. Id. at 499.
79. Jenkins v. United Gas Corp., 400 F.2d 28, 30 n.3 (5th Cir. 1968).
80. 70 L.R.R.M. 2638 (N.D. Ga. 1968).

81. Id. at 2639.
82. 70 L.R.R.M. 2632 (N.D. Miss. 1969).
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respondent's contention that the plaintiffs could not maintain a class
action because they were not members of the class. The court said:
It is foolhardy to say that once plaintiffs have removed racial
discrimination practices at the door, they are required to start
anew in order to remove those that exist on the inside. Such a
practice would result in a multiplicity of suits and a waste of
time and money for all interested parties. 8
Again, if the Act is a public act and if the charging party is a
"private attorney general," there is no rational basis for the courts
to limit litigation in a class suit to the charges the plaintiff raised before
the Commission. The criterion should not be the actual impact of
the discrimination upon the plaintiff but the potential impact of the
discrimination.
Another important procedural problem has arisen in respect to
class actions - that of the right to damages by members of the class
who did not file a charge with the EEOC. Although the courts
acknowledge that for injunction purposes, a member of the class need
not have filed a charge with the EEOC, they feel that his failure to
file a charge with the EEOC prevents him from obtaining relief in
the form of back pay or damages.8 4 The reasoning behind this doctrine is twofold: (1) the courts feel ,that the granting of monetary
relief would encourage circumvention of the Act by discouraging recourse to the Commission in the first instance, and (2) they regard
damages or back pay as a private remedy, not a public one.
Both of these arguments are baseless. To compel each member
of the class to bring separate suits puts a premium upon the private Q
aspects of the Act, and would result in a multiplicity of suits. To view
back pay as a private remedy is at odds with the NLRB's long experience in this area. The Board has always looked upon the awarding
of back pay not as a private remedy but as a public remedy necessary to effectuate the purposes of the Act. 5 Under the broad powers
in section 706(a) the courts have the power to award back pay.
This ability to award it is in accordance with the concept that the
charging party is an attorney general who sues to vindicate not only
his personal rights but the rights of all those adversely affected by
8
discriminatory practices.

6

83. Id. at 2637.

84. Bowe v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 272 F. Supp. 332 (S.D. Ind. 1967) ; Hall v.
Werthan Bag Corp., 251 F. Supp. 184 (M.D. Tenn. 1966).
85. Nathanson v. NLRB, 344 U.S. 25 (1952); Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB,
313 U.S. 177 (1941); Amalgamated Utility Workers v. Consolidated Edison Co.,
309 U.S. 261 (1940).
86. In Local 186 v. Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co., 71 L.R.R.M. 2427 (N.D. Ind.
1969), a case in which the writer served as a conciliator, the District Court held that
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A class action suit means little if the courts deny damages to
members of a class. This policy would sap class actions of most of
their strength. The Civil Rights Act is a remedial statute and all
parties who have been injured should be made whole. It is difficult
not to suspect that the courts are not being overly fearful of large
damage claims without adequate consideration that the threat of such
claims would promote private settlements - the policy of the Act.
On the whole the response of the federal courts to the procedural
aspects of Title VII has been encouraging. Despite some disconcerting
decisions 'by some district courts emphasizing the private nature of
Title VII, there is evidence in such opinions as Newman and Jenkins
that the Supreme Court and the circuit courts will accentuate the public
nature of the Act.
all non-charging and non-exhausting class members were entitled to damages. The
court stressing the public nature of the Act stated that it had inherent power to
award damages:
Finally, even the defendant implicitly concedes that some of the cases it relies
upon have properly concluded that an award of relief in the form of reinstatement
and back pay is inherently a matter of judicial discretion. That other courts have
chosen to exercise this discretion by refusing such relief is not sufficient reason,
by itself, for this court to stay its hand if the surrounding circumstances warrant
judicial relief ...
Id. at 2436.
Earlier the court stated:
[Tihe limitation here urged by defendant on possible relief for the alleged
sexual discrimination policy in defendant's plant seems particularly inconsistent
with the public nature of such suits, as expressed by the United States Supreme
Court in Newman v. Piggie Park Enterprises, Inc., 390 U.S. 400 (1968), and
further amplified by the Fifth Circuit in Jenkins v. United Gas Corp., 400 F.2d
28, 69 L.R.R.M. 2152 (5th Cir. 1968).
It seems abundantly clear that the public interest emphasized above is and
should be served just as much, if not more, by relief through awards for back wages
and reinstatement to obscure class members as by the issuance of an injunction.
Moreover, the limitations urged here by defendant seem even more inconsistent with the reasoning of Oatis v. Crown Zellerbach and its progeny; to wit,
that it is wasteful, if not vain, for all employees with the same grievance to file
charges with the Commission. If that reasoning be persuasive, and the court finds
that it is, then back wages and reinstatement, if appropriate, should be awarded
without regard to which employee in fact filed.
Id. at 2434-35.
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